In this qualitative and inductive paper, we examined population-level learning by addressing the effects of failure events on the nature and mix of routines in a population. We reviewed approximately 50 failures and near-failures in 28 industry histories to assess how they affected other organizations in the industry and practices in the industry as a whole. Findings suggest that three broad ways these events affect practices enacted by other organizations, or population-level patterns of routines: (1) through direct consequences of failure, (2) through reactions to failure by other organizations, and (3) through consequences of reactions to failure. Furthermore, population-level learning from failure can occur in at least two distinguishable forms: (1) In interorganizational population-level learning, many organizations of a population react to the failure of another organization; hence, the change of routines is informed by some shared experience. (2) In collective population-level learning, the learning processes involve collective actions, outcomes, institutions, and/or routines. Our analysis suggests that failure events can be a powerful engine of population-level learning, although this learning is not necessarily or always adaptive. The processes and outcomes of population-level-learning are complex and can lead to results that were not intended and might harm the population. Finally, strategic implications of learning from failure will be discussed. 2 Historically, organization theory appears to have a "success bias." Much of the scholarly empirical literature has a distinct survivor bias because most research is on traits and processes only in surviving organizations (Hannan & Freeman, 1977; 1989) . Theories emphasizing interorganizational learning tend to focus on the replication of routines and designs of apparently successful organizations (Burns & Wholey, 1993; Conell & Cohn, 1995) , and diffusion studies suffer from an almost exclusive focus on practices that have successfully diffused (Rogers, 1995; Strang & Soule, 1998) . Not surprisingly, organizational learning theory, which has gained substantial popularity in the domain of strategic management, chiefly addresses how managers can help their firms succeed and grow by learning the strategies and routines of presumably successful firms. Studies on bankruptcy and disasters, of course, represent important exceptions to this general trend (Perrow, 1984; Sutton & Callahan, 1987) , and researchers in the population ecology tradition have placed organizational failure at center stage in their research program (Hannan & Freeman, 1984; Hannan & Carroll, 1992; Baum, 1996) . Failure, in these contexts, however, almost always represents the dependent variable. Causal models focus on what predicts it, or how to avoid it.
Historically, organization theory appears to have a "success bias." Much of the scholarly empirical literature has a distinct survivor bias because most research is on traits and processes only in surviving organizations (Hannan & Freeman, 1977; 1989) . Theories emphasizing interorganizational learning tend to focus on the replication of routines and designs of apparently successful organizations (Burns & Wholey, 1993; Conell & Cohn, 1995) , and diffusion studies suffer from an almost exclusive focus on practices that have successfully diffused (Rogers, 1995; Strang & Soule, 1998) . Not surprisingly, organizational learning theory, which has gained substantial popularity in the domain of strategic management, chiefly addresses how managers can help their firms succeed and grow by learning the strategies and routines of presumably successful firms. Studies on bankruptcy and disasters, of course, represent important exceptions to this general trend (Perrow, 1984; Sutton & Callahan, 1987) , and researchers in the population ecology tradition have placed organizational failure at center stage in their research program (Hannan & Freeman, 1984; Hannan & Carroll, 1992; Baum, 1996) . Failure, in these contexts, however, almost always represents the dependent variable. Causal models focus on what predicts it, or how to avoid it.
In this paper, we ask a different question: What effects do the failure or near-failure of one or more organizations have on the larger groups of which they are a member? In asking this, we supplement these traditional approaches by considering organizational failure as an independent variable. So far a relatively small number of studies has attempted to study failure as an independent variable. Studies on rate dependence within the population ecology framework provide some evidence that failure has a curvilinear effect on the survival prospects of other firms within the industry (Delacroix & Carroll, 1983; Delacroix, Swaminathan, & Solt, 1989) . Applying a learning framework, Sitkin (1992) studied the impact of failure within the firm and its use as a potential strategic asset. Ingram and Baum (1997) investigated how competitive experience or the history of failures in the US hotel industry affects the survival chances of the remaining firms within this industry. We apply a population-level learning framework to explore ways in which the immanent or actual failure of an organization, routine, or set of routines affects population-level transformation. We define population-level learning as systematic change in the nature and mix of routines in a population of organizations arising from shared experience (Miner & Haunschild, 1995) . In this study, routine is defined broadly and include processes for producing goods and services, administrative procedures such as hiring or choosing suppliers, policies concerning research and development or financing, and strategies about product diversification and market selection (March & Simon, 1958; Cyert & March, 1963; Nelson & Winter, 1982) .
In pursuing our research agenda, we followed an inductive process. We first selected industry histories that described failures and near-failures of organizations and/or organizational routines, and then examined the apparent effects of these failure and near-failure incidents. The cases we studied pointed to two broad forms of failure-driven population-level learning in terms of the way in which learning is collective. Each of these forms can produce changes in the nature and mix of routines enacted in a population of organizations. In interorganizational population-level learning, there is collective learning in the sense that many organizations react to the same external failures, so that shared experience informs change. The learning can be seen as collective because it arises from shared rather than independent organizational experience. It may also involve shared interpretations of the experience of others. For example, if a highly visible firm fails and many other firms not only observe the failure, but also develop a shared interpretation of that failure, the learning can be seen as collective. While this form of population-level learning may also involve vicarious learning by individual organizations, the less each vicarious learning incident is independent, the more the process can be seen as one of population-level learning. The population-level outcomes can be seen as the sum of individual organizations' action in some cases, but the outcomes are not the simple sum of independent individual actions.
In collective population-level learning, the learning processes involve fully collective actions, outcomes, institutions, and/or routines. For example, if a new industry association or coordination routine arises within a population of organizations, this would represent collective population-level learning, as would a population of organizations in one country imitating the population-level practices in another. Finally, the cases suggest that ongoing interactions between many different organizations can create industrywide effects that have meaning only at a population-level and may not even be known to some of the organizational participants. That is, the interactions between the failing firms and previously marginal independent stations produced a systematic change in industrywide norms that the participants were not necessarily even aware of. The "learning" occurred entirely within interactions, and the outcomes involved norms, which in some sense only have meaning in collectivities.
METHOD
To explore the issues of failure's potential impact on the nature and mix of routines in populations of organizations, we reviewed industry histories, structuration studies, cases, and general histories of technological evolution including 10 volumes (40 issues) of Business History Review (1987 Review ( -1996 . Our research process was inductive. As suggested by Ragin (1987) and Eisenhardt (1989) , we did not formulate any hypotheses prior to our research. Instead, we focused on building theory from what we observed in the cases reviewed. To achieve our inductive agenda, we first objectively coded each case and analyzed our coding afterward through iterations of independent review and discussion of incidents.
Choice of Cases
We read and coded cases from multiple sources using two criteria to decide whether a case was appropriate for the study or not. First, at least one failure or near-failure had to be recorded in the case. Failure consisted of organizational death; near-failure consisted of apparently poor financial consequences or an acquisition by another firm that was discussed as a "rescue" of a nearly bankrupt company. We included both failure and near-failure because we wanted to see whether both generate reactions and population-level consequences. Second, we eliminated cases in which the authors' objective was to include an analysis or interpretation of responses to the failures they recorded. The latter is important because we wanted to minimize the chance of including cases that had already been interpreted in ways that would bias our results.
Some sources contained more easily analyzable and more reliable descriptions of failures and their consequences than others. In particular, articles published in the Business History Review proved to be especially thorough and rich, and most depict entire histories or at least long time periods of existence of industries, organizations, or technologies. Hence, we selected many articles published in the Business History Review. We searched the articles for descriptions of failures or near-failures and then included those that satisfied the criteria described above. Table   1 outlines the 28 cases that informed in our analysis.
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Analysis
In reviewing each historical description, we first recorded every actual or immanent failure by an organization or an industry, its date, and a brief description of the failure. We then searched for any reactions to or consequences of the failure. Reactions and consequences were only recorded if they were vicarious in the sense that they affected other organizations or an entire population. We wanted to exclude any reaction that represented a firm learning from its own experience alone.
Hence, if a company reacted to its own failure and that reaction did not have any apparent effect on other firms, the case was not included in our analysis. For accuracy and reliability, each case was reviewed by at least two researchers. When inconsistencies occurred between the individual reviews, the investigators met to discuss the inconsistencies and reach consensus. In most cases, the researchers were consistent in their recording of failures and reactions or consequences. In the few cases in which inconsistencies occurred, we were able to reach agreement during their discussions.
In all, we considered 52 incidents in the 28 cases and noted about 75 distinct effects (the same incident sometimes had more than one effect).
After the incidents were recorded, we independently reviewed the cases for evidence of their apparent impact and met in multiple, iterative brainstorming sessions to find patterns within the reactions to and consequences of the failures recorded. We first developed agreements on the existence of distinct incidents, then considered apparent effects of each incident through approximately five review sessions, and finally independently and collectively generated higherorder groupings to all the incident-level effects. We found that a categorization scheme with three broad groupings captured meaningful variation among the cases. In addition, the apparent effects of the incidents suggested two levels of population-level learning.
FRUITS OF FAILURE: VARIETIES OF EFFECTS OF FAILURE
In reviewing the effects of failure described in the cases, we observed three broad groupings: (1) direct effects of failure, (2) reactions to failure, and (3) consequences of failure.
The first category consists of consequences that affect the population directly or materially, such as the simple elimination of practices carried out by the failed firms. These direct effects of failure have long been noted by students of organizations and economics and will not represent a major focus of our analysis. The second category represents the reactions of organizations and populations that observed failure. This category contains both effects related to actions by many individual organizations, but involving shared experiences, norms, or meaning (interorganizational population-level learning), and effects that are clearly collective and affect the population as a whole (collective population-level learning). The last category entails the consequences of reactions to failure and their impact on population-level transformation.
Each category includes several subcategories that were grouped by the specific effects of failure. Based on the level of reaction or consequences, we also categorized each subcategory into two groups: (1) interorganizational level and (2) collective level. Table 2 summarizes our findings. In the following sections, we describe these processes and show how the studies reviewed suggest their existence.
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The direct effects of failure are those that affect the population directly or materially. We observed several cases in which organizations did not seem to change their routines intentionally as a result of the failures of other organizations, but the failures of one organization produced direct changes in the mix of routines in the population. This category includes removal of routines and industry consolidation.
Removal of Routines
In some of our cases, the failures of individual organizations and/or their organizational routines changed the nature and mix of routines in the population by simply removing routines from practice. In some cases, this appeared to be related to shifts to apparently more "efficient" routines, but in others, one could not draw such a strong conclusion. For example, Volti (1992) showed how death changes the nature and the mix of routines in a population of organizations. He described how, with the rise of the railroad, the Pony Express died, and the practices and organizational routines associated with the Pony Express no longer thrived in the population of organizations carrying mail and passengers. Another example is the well-publicized battle between the VHS and the Betamax format in the VCR market. Although considered technically superior by many observers, Sony's Betamax format was eliminated from the market partially because its limitations in recording time made it less efficient for consumers than the VHS format (Yoffie, Aoki, and Debari, 1987) . The routines associated with the Betamax format, developed by Sony through years of experience and experimentation, disappeared or were shifted to other technologies (Cusumano, Mylonadis, & Rosenbloom, 1992) . A third example of the removal of routines is provided in Bugos's (1992) description of how, through the extinction of smaller, secondary businesses, certain practices disappeared from the chicken-breeding industry, and routines became more homogenized within the population.
Failure of a set of organizations in an industry frequently leads to industry consolidation.
This could occur as a direct result of failure of members of an industry or as a result of subsequent mergers and acquisitions. Bugos's (1992) case provides an example of industry consolidation as a direct result of failure. The number of American chicken hatcheries dropped from 11,400 in 1934 to 1,200 in 1971; many small hatcheries failed because it was difficult to place the "right" number of chicks in the reproductive pipeline. At the same time, the average size of the hatcheries rose from 46,000 to 2.5 million chicks per year (Bugos, 1992) . This pattern of industry concentration among hatcheries contributed to the further demise of small hatcheries and created barriers against new hatcheries by making genetic uniformity and quality assurance more important.
An example of industry consolidation by subsequent mergers and acquisitions can be found in the history of the U.S. steel industry (Scherrer, 1991) . Until the late 1960s, the U.S. steel industry was dominated by a handful of large integrated steel mills, but the emergence of new competition from both foreign steel producers and minimills severely threatened the survival of the integrated mills. After experiencing a series of failures due to their inability to compete with more efficient minimills and low-cost foreign producers, those integrated mills that survived began to consolidate their capacity through mergers and acquisitions to achieve higher efficiency.
Reactions to Failure of Organizations/Routines
In many of the incidents we assessed, the failure of a focal organization and/or their routines appeared to stimulate reactions by other organizations. We also found evidence of population (collectivity) level reactions to failure.
Organization-Level Reactions
We observed that organizations often react to failure they have experienced or observed by taking a certain course of actions. Consistent with our definition of population-level learning, organization-level effects are those that occur at the organizational level, but as a result of shared experiences, norms, and meaning, and that are clearly collective and affect the population as a whole. This is what makes this analysis distinct from other organizational learning studies and distinguishes population-level learning from organizational level learning.
Although reactions occurred at the organization-level, those reactions were driven by shared experiences, norms, and meanings rather than an individual organization's unique experience.
Thus, organizations' reactions to their own failures were not included in this analysis because our primary interest lies in interorganizational learning rather than intraorganizational learning.
The organizational level reactions include imitation, inferential learning, and reinforcing existing routines.
Imitation. One organizational level reaction we detected is the imitation of other, apparently successful routines triggered by the failure of an organization within the focal population. In his analysis of the U.S. and German machine tools industries, Herrigel (1994) described how American and German firms, pressured by severe market share losses and failures within their industries, finally shifted their focus from more traditional machines to computer numerical control (CNC) machines, thereby copying practices that Japanese producers had already applied for years. Although the American and German manufacturers had technical and managerial capabilities similar to their Japanese competitors, it took failures within their populations to make that transition and imitate practices that had made the Japanese dominant in the marketplace.
The U.S. steel industry also reacted to failure by imitating competitive practices (Scherrer, 1991) . After many American integrated steel manufacturers had sustained immense losses due to decreased demand for their products and increased competition by foreign firms and minimills, they decided to imitate what they perceived as the practices that provided their competitors with a competitive edge. Scherrer (1991: 196) noted, "Since the Japanese mills represented the most efficient practice in sheet production, and since the latest minimills epitomized the best practice in production of small bars and rods, Big steel had to follow the Japanese and the minimill examples, respectively." The American integrated steel mills never succeeded in their quest to imitate those practices effectively and recapture lost market share.
Nevertheless, Scherrer's account of the U.S. steel industry provides an unambiguous example of interorganizational imitation triggered by failure.
Inferential learning. We also found cases in which firms clearly attempted to draw inferences from the failures they observed to avoid failing themselves. Thus, rather than imitate the routines of others perceived as more successful, these firms either did not imitate the failing routines of others or developed entirely new routines presumed to be better than those that had failed. For example, the failure of many new airlines that were incorporated after the deregulation of the U.S. airline industry in 1978 provided an opportunity for inferential learning to the population of the U.S. airline industry. Braniff International Corporation (BIC) and People Express (PE) were among the companies that took off right after the airline deregulation to capture the newly created market opportunities. BIC and PE were incorporated in 1978 and in 1980, respectively, and their capacity and market share expanded at an unprecedented rate.
Their fundamental marketing strategies were to create and maintain passenger volume by offering extremely low fares. But, while their cut-rate strategy allowed them to increase their market share rapidly, it did not provide them with sufficient financial return to cover the costs incurred from rapid expansion. Despite their initial success, BIC filed for a bankruptcy in 1982, and PE shortly followed BIC's fate (Kharbanda & Stallworthy, 1985; Whitestone, 1983) . Their failure suggested that a cut-rate, cut-throat route strategy might not be a viable strategic choice (Kharbanda & Stallworthy, 1985) . Other airline companies that observed their failure slowed down price-cutting competition and began implementing other strategies, such as rigorous frequent flyer programs and improved customer services (Kharbanda & Stallworthy, 1985) . U.S. tire manufacturers also used failure to draw inferences about the appropriateness of certain practices (French, 1986) . After the bankruptcy of several firms, including the reputable Carolina Rubber Company in the early 1930s, the remaining firms started developing new practices to enhance their prospects of survival. Among these new practices were the introduction of second, third, and fourth-line tires, to achieve better market segmentation, and the reduction of the number of dealers, to become more cost-efficient. These practices were not copied from other organizations but were developed to avoid the fate of the failed companies. Suchman (1994) presented a case of inferential learning that has particular potential for understanding population-level learning. He described the role of venture capital firms in Silicon Valley, where venture capitalists inevitably observe failures of organizations, represented by start-up firms, at a minimum in their own portfolio of investments. In Silicon Valley, venture capitalists had substantial interaction with each other and developed working norms not only about the structure of their investments but about the role of the venture capitalist. In particular, they tended to go beyond passive investment and play an active role in policy and strategic management choices of the firms in which they invested. This practice means that whatever lessons they drew from their own prior failures, or acquired from contacts with other venture capitalists, would powerfully affect activities in new businesses in which they invested.
Silicon Valley law firms also had a substantial influence on fundamental management choices that was well beyond passive legal advice, so that we would expect the lessons they drew from prior failures of organizations to be reflected in activities in many Silicon Valley firms (Suchman, 1994) . In general, consulting firms and venture capitalists may be more likely than other organizations to see multiple failures and to have access to detailed organizational information from which one could draw inferences about the causes of failure. According to Suchman (1994) , Silicon
Valley venture capitalists and law firms are important transmitters of learning from failure.
Inferential learning does not always benefit organizations that engage in such learning.
Organizations could draw incorrect inferences from failure they have observed, and construct an illusionary causal relationship about the failure. This superstitious inferential learning could negatively affect the survival prospect of the organizations and the population they belong to (Huber, 1991) . A good example of such superstitious learning can be found in the history of the U.S. television industry. In the 1970s, the U.S. television manufacturing industry was seriously threatened by the invasion of the market by TVs from cost-efficient Japanese television manufacturers. Several U.S. television manufacturers failed to compete successfully with the Japanese competitors and were acquired by the large Japanese firms. U.S. television manufacturers, including RCA and Zenith, responded to this threat chiefly by taking cost take-out measures, because they believed that the Japanese firms' primary competitive advantages was their manufacturing efficiency (Hamel & Prahalad, 1988) . But they were not aware of the Japanese firms' ability to cross-subsidize market-share battles. Hamel and Prahalad (1991: 20) noted that "by the time the U.S. firms closed the cost gap, Japanese competitors had established pre-emptive distribution and brand positions in most of the world's critical national markets." The Japanese firms had broadened their profit sanctuaries by rigorously expanding their international distribution systems and consolidating their brand names, while the U.S. firms' sales were limited to the U.S. market. Therefore, if a price war was initiated, the Japanese firms could subsidize their loss in the U.S. market with the profit from their well-protected domestic market and third-country markets, while their U.S. counterparts had few options. This superstitious population-wide reaction to potential failure by the U.S. television manufacturers eventually resulted in the virtual extinction of the U.S. television industry.
Reinforcing existing routines (Active inertia). Imitation and inferential learning focus on change as a reaction to the failure of other organizations, but firms did not react to the failure they observed by changing their routines. Consistent with the ideas of competency traps (Levitt & March, 1988) and threat rigidity (Ocasio, 1995; Staw, Sandelands, & Dutton, 1981) , we found that some organizations react to the failures of others by reinforcing their existing routines, even though they appear to have been closely related to the routines of the failures they observed.
Thus, failure of organizations in a population could result in a reinforcement of existing routines of organizations that observed the failure, a reaction we call "active inertia."
After the diesel locomotive was introduced in the U.S. in the early 1930s, the American Locomotive Company (ALCo) was a major force in the industry (Churella, 1995) . Although ALCo enjoyed sound financial status, good relations with its customers, and decades of experience in steam locomotive production, it quickly lost market share after the introduction of the diesel locomotive. ALCo's market share dropped from about 70 percent in 1935 to 11 percent in 1957. Moreover, in 1957 ALCo observed the bankruptcies of two steam locomotive producers, Baldwin Locomotive Works and Lima Locomotive Works, which were similar to ALCo in their structures and routines. Nevertheless, ALCo continued to focus on its steam locomotive capabilities by committing more resources instead of switching to the diesel technology that apparently had come to dominate the market. In particular, ALCo developed internal promotion patterns through which only engineers with steam technology background could rise to the top and defended its strategy to concentrate on the steam engine vehemently in public. By 1969, ALCo had been completely driven out of the locomotive industry (Churella, 1995) .
A second example is provided by Utterback's description of the developments at Eastman Kodak and in the American photography industry. During the 1930s, sales of roll film made of celluloid began to explode with the introduction of the Kodak system. This posed a significant threat to the survival of producers of the dry gelatin plate film that had been used by photographers before the introduction of the celluloid film. Producers reacted to this threat by improving the existing technology of dry plate photography. As a result, a number of improvements poured into the market (Utterback, 1995) , but those improvements were not good enough to save them. They all eventually failed. Although some of the dry gelatin plate film producers had capabilities to develop the celluloid film, they chose to defend their old technology even in the face of technological discontinuity (Anderson and Tushman, 1990 ).
Collectivity-Level Reactions
In analyzing the cases, we also found evidence that failure often induces a collective reaction by members of a population rather than organizational level reactions. Collectivity-level reactions include compensating action, the creation of a new entity, and an alerting effect.
Compensating Action
Efforts to head off further failure in an industry represent an important reaction to immanent or actual failures of individual organizations. Compensating action took various forms and was driven by various entities. Government activity may be the most important and most prevalent form of what we call compensating action and it is typically spurred by members of an industry. For example, the Italian government developed a concern in 1977 with possible impending failure in the chemical fiber industry (Kenis, 1992) . After five years of planning efforts to restructure the industry, massive changes were finally made in the 1980s. These changes involved shifts in the financial practices, legal standing, governance structures, employment practices, and organizational restructuring.
The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), a commission established in 1952 to coordinate the European coal and steel industry, responded similarly to the crisis of the European steel industry, which experienced a collapse of steel demand in 1975 due to the poor state of the European economies and the long-term trend toward the use of nonferrous materials. The sharp decline in steel demand coupled with the increasing global competition posed a serious threat to the survival of the industry (Kogut, 1986) . To bring an end to the crisis, the ECSC developed a series of measures to balance the supply and demand of steel, including setting production targets, fixing minimum prices, regulating import competition, and decreasing production capacity.
In the U.S. electronics industry, firms concerned about immanent and actual failures in the industry in the 1980s pressured the government to change the antitrust laws in the 1980s.
The subsequent changes in antitrust law permitted the creation of many cooperative research consortia in the industry, representing a shift in the nature and mix of cooperative routines at work in this population of organizations (Evan & Olk, 1990) .
The German government reacted to a bitter crisis in the machine tool industry with several measures that were designed to improve the competitiveness of German manufacturers in world markets. Federal and state governments offered free consulting services to small and medium-sized firms in the industry to help them develop and market competitive technologies.
Additionally, the federal government cooperated with industry associations to develop a special subsidy program to support research and development efforts associated with the CNC technology (Herrigel, 1994) .
Compensating action by the government sometimes takes place when the factors contributing to failure are difficult for the industry to control by itself. For example, in 1960s, the survival of railroads in the northeastern region of the U.S., the most densely populated part of the country, was substantially threatened partly because they were saddled with obligations to carry unprofitable passenger traffic. The railroads' attempts to cope with this problem proved to be a failure, as evidenced by the bankruptcies of the Pennsylvania and New York railroads in the late 1960s (Kennedy, 1991) . To reduce the burden on the U.S. railroads of carrying unprofitable passenger traffic, Congress created the national passenger railroad corporation, today called Amtrak, in 1970.
Industry-level cooperation efforts also represent another form of collective response to failure. An example of this can be found in the U.S. nuclear energy sector. The accident at Three Mile Island in 1979 severely jeopardized the legitimacy and survival of the U.S. nuclear energy industry. Having realized that another accident would bury commercial nuclear power in U.S., the firms in the industry cooperated by mobilizing through associations and promotional networks to regain public confidence and improve technology (Campbell, 1994) . Later, several firms formed joint ventures to purchase nuclear power plants together to spread the risk and use their resources more efficiently.
Creation of New Entity
Some members of industries we studied reacted to a failure by creating a new entity in an effort to prevent further failure. Creating a new entity may yield new routines in the population and, consequently, produce population-level learning. For example, the existence of the U.S. (Aldrich & Sasaki, 1994; Murphy, 1982) . This, in turn, represented a new "collective routine" for the population as a whole (Miner and Haunschild, 1995) and added to the representation of collaborative routines in the population as a whole.
German steel firms created a new entity in the form of sales associations to control their prices when they were threatened by hyper-price competition (Kogut, 1986) . Similarly, firms in the U.S. nuclear energy sector responded to the Three Mile Island accident by instituting an association to promote safety and R&D (Campbell, 1994) , a new entity that added routines to the industry.
Alerting Effect
A less traditional potential impact of organizational failure is its alerting effect for other members of an industry or organizational community. Observers of organizations have long noted that failure is difficult to interpret within organizations (Sitkin, 1992) . Internal actors may conclude that their own failure is a signal to work harder on a particular objective or business, rather than a sign that they are in the wrong business (Levinthal & March, 1993) . Our review of industry histories seems to indicate, however, that the failure or dramatic downturns of other, major firms can stimulate firms to conclude there may be fundamental problems in their industry, or at least in the implementation or execution their business, and to respond to this by developing new routines. In a study of industrial decline and reorganization in the Ruhr region of Germany, for example, Grabher (1990) noted that decreased demand in itself had little impact. He suggested that only after plant closures and the movement of the headquarters of the oldest firm of the coal, iron, and steel complex to another region did firms undertake a reassessment of their situation and begin to create new core business areas.
Failures, in contrast to other problems or downturns, may have a special impact because they are both more visible and more salient to observers (Haunschild & Miner, 1995) . An important feature of this "wake-up call" effect, however, is that it does not necessarily contain information about what firms should do differently in the future. Failure may therefore not lead to any action by the observer but rather to a firm's "non-action." The observing firms may be alerted not to follow the actions of the failed organization. Moreover, that the alerting effect can occur does not, of course, mean that it always does occur. In the Swiss watch industry, for example, observers noted that for many years failures did not, in fact, appear to produce an alerting effect (Porter & Hoff, 1980) .
Consequences of Reactions to Failure
In many cases we observed, the actions taken by individual organizations, groups of organizations, or higher-level entities worked together to create consequences that affected the entire population, frequently in unanticipated ways and sometimes without full awareness of the actors. An interesting aspect of this phenomenon is that action taken intentionally at the organization level frequently produced unintentional population-level consequences. In all, we found three different classes of consequences of reactions to failure, which we term "secondhand legitimacy", a "boomerang effect", and a "poisoned well effect." Second Hand Legitimacy Leblebici et al., (1991) described several phases of industry evolution in the United States radio broadcasting community. In the phase from 1950 to 1965, radio networks were concerned about potential failure because of the threat posed by the rise of television. The national networks reportedly tried to extend their businesses, experimenting with such areas as simulcasting audio portions of TV shows, stereo AM and FM broadcasts, and new forms of pay radio, none of which rescued their existing business or evolved into a new radio business area. During the same period, independent, local radio stations introduced many innovative and successful practices that cut their operating costs drastically and helped them to win back advertisers who had defected to TV. The national networks then changed their radio businesses by imitating apparently successful features of local radio broadcasting, such as adding more focused programming, using pre-recorded music (rather than live), and having "special format" shows aimed at specialized audiences. Although these did not work to revive the national networks' programming business, evidently in part because such programming depends on local knowledge, which national networks did not have (Leblebici et al., 1991) , the adoption of these activities in response to the threat of failure legitimized such practices and made them part of the mainstream norms of the radio broadcasting industry. We call this effect second-hand legitimization.
In essence, the networks' response to the threat of failure ultimately strengthened the standing of local radio broadcasters and the influence of their practices. From a population learning perspective, the radio networks' responses to potential failure eventually eroded their own strengths but produced population-level learning of the new programming practices such as special formats and pre-recorded music. Leblebici et al. (1991) described other, similar transitions in which efforts failed to revive flagging businesses but set in motion new practices that came to permeate the industry and in some cases provide new businesses for others.
In a study of the U.S. steel industry, Scherrer (1991) provided another example of second-hand legitimacy. The U.S. steel industry had been governed by the oligopolistic structure for generations. A few, vertically integrated companies controlled most of American steel production and dominated the market.
1 This oligopolistic structure, coupled with the collusive behavior of the large steel producers, enabled the integrated steel mills to effectively control the price structure and protected them from demand fluctuations. In the late 1960s, however, the emergence of new competition began to threaten the oligopolistic power of the integrated steel mills. Foreign steel producers, which benefited from low labor costs, low capital costs, and a drastic decline in ocean freight rates, rapidly expanded their market share in the United States. In addition, the widespread use of nonferrous materials such as plastics and aluminum significantly decreased the steel demand (Scherrer, 1991) . At the same period, the minimills emerged, using advanced technologies such as the electric furnace and continuous casting, which provided substantial capital and labor savings (Scherrer, 1991) , and they began to erode the market share of the integrated mills. The use of more efficient technology, in combination with the advantage of specialization and a high-capacity utilization rate, allowed the minimills to achieve much higher productivity than the integrated mills. The higher productivity helped many minimills to remain profitable even when the steel demand was low.
In 1970s, after experiencing severe financial and market share loss, the integrated mills attempted to improve their manufacturing efficiencies by imitating practices of the minimills.
They modernized their existing facilities, and some integrated mills bought or built their own minimills. But little worked. Because most integrated minimills operated substantially below capacity, the addition of new minimills meant further deterioration of their already low utilization rates (Scherrer, 1991) . The integrated mills' attempts to adopt the minimills' practices, however, led to the convergence of the integrated mills' practices with that of the minimills. While the integrated mills decreased their degree of vertical integration by importing an increasing amount of semi-finished steel, the minimills strengthened their control over their raw material. While the integrated mills narrowed down their product variety, the minimills expanded their product variety. In summary, the integrated mills' attempts to improve their productivity by imitating minimills strengthened the legitimacy of practices they copied from the minimills. From the population-level perspective, the integrated mills' attempts to address impending failure did not provide the solutions to their problems, but they did produce population-level learning of new practices in the U.S. steel industry.
Boomerang Effect
When IBM first entered the personal computer (PC) market in 1981, it chose not to design its own proprietary system but to adopt an open modular system, which allowed competitors to produce compatible machines. This open system strategy gave IBM a majority stake in the PC standard, but made it vulnerable to the competition from clone manufacturers.
By 1988, IBM's worldwide market share of IBM-compatible PCs decreased to only 24.5% (Langlois, 1992 Scherrer (1991) provided another example of the boomerang effect in his study of the U.S. steel mills. The strong challenge of low-cost foreign steel producers posed a significant threat to the survival of the U.S. integrated mills, which responded by persuading the government to impose import quotas that would restrict the amount of steel imported. The foreign producers reacted with a shift to higher-priced products and with a substantial increase in prices for wire rods, which had been their major export. On one hand, these foreign steel producers' reactions exacerbated the U.S. integrated mills' declining market position, because the foreign producers began to erode the higher-priced product market that had been occupied by the integrated mills. On the other hand, the U.S. minimills became the principal beneficiaries of these reactions, because they were able to capture the wire-rod market share that was dropped by the foreign producers (Scherrer, 1991) . Thus, the population-level reaction of the US integrated mills (the push for protectionism) to their failure triggered a population-level reaction that worsened the situation for one segment of the U.S. steel-producing population but benefited the other segment.
Poisoned-Well
In some of the industry accounts analyzed here, failure of one organization or routine was interpreted by other organizations as a signal that the population was not receptive to the kind of organizations or routines that failed. It was assumed that the population was a poisoned well for the specific, failed routines, and often those routines were removed from the population. For example, after several failing attempts to improve manufacturing efficiency, several of the U.S.
integrated mills began to examine the possibility of constructing or acquiring a minimill (Scherrer, 1991) . Armco built one minimill and bought another, but they both failed. Other integrated mills that attempted to enter the minimill sector followed a similar fate. As a result, none of the major U.S. integrated mills operates a minimill now (Scherrer, 1991) . The failure of several major integrated mills signaled that operating minimills was not an appropriate strategy for the integrated mill population, and the strategy was removed from the population without further attempts.
Another interesting example of this effect can be found in David's (1991) description of the so-called battle of standards over the direct current (DC) and the alternating current (AC) in the electrical supply industry. During 1887-1892, the DC system, supported by Edison, and the AC system, represented by the Westinghouse and Thompson-Houston companies, were competing for the electricity supply market (David, 1991) . Edison vigorously opposed the introduction of the AC system, arguing it was dangerous and inefficient, but his DC system, in which he had invested his intellectual and financial assets, eventually lost out. After Edison had withdrawn from the electrical supply business, no solely DC-oriented manufacturing entity existed in the U.S. (David, 1991) although several European countries successfully developed DC-based electrical systems later. Leaving aside the issue of the relative economic and technological superiority of the two competing systems, the salient failure of Edison and his company signaled that the U.S. was not a fertile place for DC-based systems to thrive and further development in the area creased.
The Danish telephone technician Valemar Poulsen invented the world's first magnetic recorder, the telegraphone. Despite the high commercial potential of the telegraphone, he failed to commercialize his invention. Aside from the facts that the telegraphone came too early and there were no available complementary technologies, the telegraphone failed because it originated in a technologically peripheral country (Clark & Nielsen, 1995) . Poulsen and his Danish associates first tried to commercialize the telegraphone in Denmark by establishing a Danish development network and joint ventures, but with little success. Poulsen eventually closed his Danish operation and turned his attention to other countries, such as Germany and the U.S. There were no further attempts to commercialize the telegraphone or other magnetic recording devices in Denmark.
The population-level outcomes driven by poisoned-well signals may have several significant strategic implications. The poisoned-well signal could produce harmful populationlevel learning, because a population might remove routines and strategies prematurely without careful examination. For example, industry experts blamed the rigid, oligopolistic structure of the steel industry for its inability to succeed in the minimill sector, but Scherrer (1991) argued that, with a proper strategy, the U.S. integrated mills could have successfully entered the minimill sector.
DISCUSSION
Potential of Failure-Driven Learning
The above evidence suggests the power of failure in driving population-level learning processes. The evidence is inductive and at this point does not allow statements on how frequently these events occur nor what their net impact may be. Work in progress, however, suggests that further review may refine our understanding of these processes as well as reveal other failure effects. The current work, combined with existing theory on population-level change, suggests potentially complex relationships between failure effects and population-level learning. Figure 1 diagrams the key relationships between failure and reactions to failure, both interorganizational and populational, and population-level consequences of these reactions. This figure represents a summary of the analyses provided by our coding of the 28 failure cases.
Insert Figure 1 Here
According to the framework outlined in Figure 1 , the failure of organizations or routines leadsto reactions to failure by organizations and/or populations, which in turn leadsto population-level consequences. We envision that the failure of organizations will, in some cases, be independent of the failure of routines, as routines may fail without their associated organizations failing (as when Sony's Betamax format failed, but Sony did not), or organizations may fail although the routines they followed are still used by others in the population. In some cases failure may lead to the elimination of a routine from the population, as when the cut-rate strategy of People Express was not used by other airlines. What is important here is that that both failure of routines and failure of organizations create responses by other organizations. The reaction to failing organizations may be to try to figure out which routine caused the failure and use that knowledge (which may, of course, be false) to avoid that routine or develop a new alternate routine.
The reactions to failure of an organization and/or a routine can be classified into those that occur interorganizationally (i.e., are the result of one or more organizations responding to the failure) and those that occur at the population-level (Figure 1) . At the interorganizational level, four general categories of reactions. These categories include, first, reactions that result in imitation of apparently more successful organizations, as in the case of integrated steel mills attempting to imitate the minimills of the Japanese. Another reaction is not imitating the failed routine or organization, as when airlines did not imitate People Express's cut-rate pricing and service strategy. A third reaction is to develop a new routine, as when surviving tire manufacturers reduced the number of dealers after several tire manufacturers went bankrupt.
Finally, a fourth reaction is to reinforce a failing routine, as when American Locomotive committed more resources to steam technology after seeing other steam locomotive producers go bankrupt, as a way of attempting to stave off failure.
Also shown in Figure 1 are the various reactions to failures by populations or other collectivities of organizations. These processes mirror the processes undertaken by organizations to some extent but are distinct in that there is a population-level response in addition to or instead of the organization-level response. For example, when the U.S. electronics industry responded to the threat of industry failure by creating the MCC industry-level research consortium, this was a population-level response of imitating routines (in this case, an industry consortium) perceived to be successful (Japan). This is a population-level, not an organizationlevel response although individual organizations were active in promoting the population-level response through lobbying and other actions. Another category of population-level responses is the creation of a new (population-level) entity, as in the case of German firms creating sales associations to control prices when threatened with failure. Finally, a third category of population-level response is through an alerting effect, resulting in the development of new routines, as when the failure at Three Mile Island stimulated the reassessment of all nuclear technologies and an effort to minimize future failures.
Although our cases did not highlight population-level processes of reacting to failure by reinforcing an existing routine or not imitating a routine, these processes may still occur in some situations. The Swiss government, for example, helped the Swiss watch industry commit resources to retaining existing firms and technologies, thus reinforcing existing routines surrounding older watch technologies even after new ones were invented (Porter & Hoff, 1980) .
The result of these organizational and populational responses on the population as a whole can take several forms, including the removal of a given routine from the population, removal of an organization from the population, and a shift in mix of routines in the population.
These three population-level consequences are not always independent, as when the removal of an organization with a unique routine removes the routine from the population or when the removal of a routine shifts the mix of routines in the population. For example, we discussed the second-hand legitimization of the routines of local broadcasters into the mainstream of the national radio broadcasting industry. The process of second-hand legitimization began with a threat of failure, which shifted the mix of routines in the radio broadcasting population (as the routines of the local broadcasters were adopted), with the eventual removal of some of the large network stations' older routines from the population. Finally, it is clear that responses to failure can have either positive or negative population-level consequences which have implications for population-level learning.
Positive Potential of Failure-Drive Interorganizational Learning
Traditionally, success has been perceived as a key generator of learning. Within organizations, success may increase slack that facilitates unintentional innovation (Levinthal & March, 1993) and can be a source of self-confidence that encourages managers to take risks (Levitt & March, 1988) . March (1981) argued that organizational change can be stimulated by success. Success often decreases the intensity of search and experimentation, however (Levinthal & March, 1993) . If a population observes a successful development by a firm that belongs to the population, other organizations in that population might follow the successful routine without rigorous search for new, perhaps better routines. This poses several dangers to the population. First, the lack of search and experimentation could lead the population to adopt a suboptimal technology as a standard (Cowan, 1990) . Second, individual firms may fall into competency traps (Levitt & March, 1988) , in which firms exploit successful procedures further, increasing the opportunity cost of exploration (Levitt & March, 1988; March, 1991) .
In contrast, failure can increase the level of search and experimentation. Failure is more salient than success in many cases. Failure that serves as a signal for the need for change may provide a relatively efficient device for population-level change. Like the canary in the mine, such failures may provoke appropriate searches for causal factors leading to such failures that then benefit the population as a whole. This relatively high visibility of failure can promote organizational learning (Haunschild and Miner, 1997) , with the result that firms note the failure and are encouraged to allocate more resources to exploring new business opportunities. This has population-level advantages in that it increases the number of variations in the population, facilitating innovation and reducing the possibility of being trapped in a suboptimal technology.
At the organizational level, failure decreases slack (Levinthal and March, 1993) . At the population-level, however, failure may increase slack and thus innovation because failure may generate experimentation within the population. The variation caused by such experimentation may increase the likelihood of creating new successful routines (Miner and Haunschild, 1995) .
Simple copying rules, such as copying successful firms, could provide faster populationlevel responses to changed circumstances but could also lead to only partial or inadequate changes in population practices. Two of the reactions to failure that we noted, organizations imitating the routines of another organization perceived as more successful and populations imitating the routines of another population perceived as more successful, involve making inferences about "success." Valid inferences from the failure of a few organizations could generate understanding of causal process that could, in principle, guide future action with more subtlety than simple copying rules (Sitkin, 1992) . That this is difficult to do is revealed by the ambiguity of results of systematic research on organizational performance outcomes. Yet, undoubtedly, making appropriate inferences from organizational failures can be done. The question is how often or in which circumstances can "appropriate" inferences occur and what are the possible problems in making such inferences?
Problems of Failure-Driven Interorganizational Learning
While organizational failure and/or failure of routines does offer the potential for population-level learning that may benefit collectivities of organizations, it may not do so.
Collective learning from failures is difficult for several reasons. First, organizations routinely mask failure to some degree, either for simple material reasons such as reducing unnecessary legal exposure, or for social reasons, such as face-saving and coalition building (Feldman & March, 1981; Pfeffer, 1981) . Even more importantly, it is difficult to make good inferences from organizational failures, even if one knows the true degree of failure and the actual actions that preceded it (Sitkin, 1992) . The ambiguity of organizational systems makes it difficult to link actions and outcomes (March & Olson, 1976) . Gaining information on failures in many other organizations generally imposes unrealistic information gathering and processing demands, especially given the difficulty organizations have in learning from even their own experiences.
Even when interorganizational/populational learning from failure does occur, it may be the result of incorrect inferences and assumptions and thus may actually harm populations. This occurs fairly commonly in early technology trajectories. Failure of the first firms to commercialize a new invention may lead others to conclude that a particular technology cannot be developed successfully when, in fact, it can be. The possibility of raising voltage and thereby lowering the cost of DC electrical systems was explored in the late 1980s in the United States.
But "because of a combination of problems associated with the battery technology available at the time, the dangers of operating a high-potential system having dynamos wired in series, and the usual run of financial difficulties, this particular project never took off, and the concept was not pursued further in the United States" (David, 1991: 565) . The British, however, did not "learn" from this failure not to pursue this line of technological development and successfully developed it. The potential for incorrect interorganizational learning means that population-level learning processes induced by failure may lead to systematically harmful outcomes, as described above, in this poisoned-well effect, in which a promising routine is not developed in and/or removed from a population (in this case, DC electrical systems in the U.S.). In other cases an organization may be removed from a population as a result of incorrect inferences caused by failures. For example, there are probably cases in which venture capitalists mistakenly use the failure of one type of start-up as a signal that they should not continue funding of another, thus removing an organization from a population. Incorrect learning could also result in harmful population outcomes early in the development of new technologies or in periods of institutional experimentation, or in systemic technologies that require the development of standards. Indeed, these processes could lead to "runaway" outcomes in which the failure of some practices alerts a population to danger, and widespread copying of ill-advised shifts to new routines or practices ensue that harm the population as a whole (Boyd & Richerson, 1985) . Our earlier case of the extinction of the U.S. television manufacturing industry illustrates this point (Hamel & Prahalad, 1988 ).
Even when population-level learning involves the diffusion of new routines that could be valuable for firms, the collective outcome can be harmful. U.S. paper manufacturers, for example, appeared to "learn" the crucial role of economies of scale, with widespread adoption of massive production equipment. The efficiency of these machines then led to an oversupply of paper, however, resulting in a dramatic decrease in profitability for the papermaking community (Taylor, 1995) . In other cases, however, the development of new efficient technologies that are adopted on a widespread basis might benefit the entire population in terms of efficiency.
Whether learning is beneficial or harmful for the population probably depends on many other factors, including the presence of a competing population, technology factors, and product characteristics.
When collections of organizations react to failures in their midst, they frequently search for solutions that can rescue them from similar failures. The urgent need for immediate solutions can lead them to adopt myopic collective solutions at the cost of better ones. For example, in the 1970s, when the European steel industry confronted a crisis due to the sharp decline in demand and increasing competition, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) developed sets of both short-term and long-term measures to head off further crisis. The short-term measures included setting production targets, fixing minimum prices, and regulating import competition, and the long-term measures included reducing the capacity of the European steel producers.
This is a form of compensating action at the population-level. The short-term measures turned out to be successful, temporarily stabilizing the European steel industry, but they made the longterm measures, which could have provided the European steel industry with a permanent solution, largely ineffective (Kogut, 1986) .
Overall, then, population-level learning that arises from the observation and reaction to the failure of organizations and routines by no means assures population-level adaptation or prosperity and could, in fact, lead to population-level decline under some circumstances.
Contributions to Understanding Population-Level Learning
This work advances work on knowledge exchange and population-level learning in several ways. First, research on population-level learning is still emerging in terms of key constructs and claims. This paper represents work in progress on developing meaningful and generative definitions and partial models of population-level learning. To have a value of its own, population-level learning needs to go beyond capturing change processes by multiple individual organizations within the same population. We began with the broad definition of population-level learning by Miner and Haunschild (1995) : systematic change in the nature and mix of routines arising from shared experience. Examining many incidents of failure and near-failure suggested two different broad forms of population-level learning, which vary in the degree to which they may be seen as collective. While consistent with the early distinction made by Miner and Haunschild concerning engines of population-level learning, these two broad forms seems to make the construct of population-level learning less ambiguous.
Specifically, the data suggested a focus on two forms of population-level learning. In interorganizational population-level learning, multiple organizations within a population change their routines as a result of shared experiences, norms, or meanings. The focus on shared experiences, norms, or meanings differentiates population-level learning from other types of learning by emphasizing the collective character. In collective population-level learning, learning occurs as collective action or action by an overarching organization such as a national government, or through purely interactive processes. Here, organizations not only share the collective cognitions, they also act collectively, sometimes creating new population-level routines and assumptions. Further research and theoretical development will be necessary to clarify how different aspects of learning may vary across levels, including knowledge generation, acquisition, transfer, and exploitation. As another example, we did not discuss the subprocesses involved in the various organizational reactions to failure listed in Figure 1 . One such important subprocess is the movement of personnel from firm to firm, especially personnel from failing or failed organizations (Haveman & Cohen, 1994) . Such movement is likely to have important effects on whether a firm reacts to failure by developing a new routine or not imitating an existing routine. Executives tend to bring routines from their previous employers to new employers (Rao & Drazin, 1998) , thus affecting the distribution of routines in organizations.
When executives move from failed firms to other firms, especially those outside their industry, such movement is likely to result in reactions to failure and thus population-level consequences.
It would be interesting to study, for example, how personnel movement from failing U.S. television manufacturers to other firms affected the distribution of routines in the industries represented by those other firms. In addition, to the degree that we claim population-level learning involves inference or shared cognition, further work can fruitfully address the interpretive aspects of population-level learning, along with issues of collective memory (Walsh, 1995) .
Our research also indicates the complexity of population-level learning. Whenever populations learn, multiple organizations will be involved, either through their actions or because they are affected by the change in the nature and mix of routines in the population.
Population-level learning, therefore, is a multilevel phenomenon, and its processes and outcomes are difficult to predict. In this paper, we show that intentional reactions to the failure of others can have unintended outcomes for the whole population. The history of the U.S. radio broadcasting industry (Leblebici et al., 1991 ) and Scherrer's (1991) account of the U.S. steel industry demonstrate that the population-level consequences of organizational actions are often unpredictable and complex. It is this complexity, however, that makes population-level learning such a fruitful and intriguing area of study. For scholars of organizations and management and practitioners alike, it will be important to better understand in which ways organizations within a population and populations themselves affect each other. The population-level learning framework appears to have particular value in studying those phenomena (Miner & Haunschild, 1995) .
This study focuses on failure as an engine for changes in the nature and mix of routines in a population. We do not claim that failure is the only or even the most important stimulus for learning, of course. Our research shows, however, that failure can trigger important changes within a population of organizations. There is very little research on the effects of failure as an independent variable (Sitkin, 1992 ). Yet the failure of one in a group of organizations generates new knowledge, which -if incorporated by others -can produce knowledge transfer. Although we have argued that this process may or may not produce adaptive or useful knowledge, we believe it represents an important form of knowledge creation and transfer. Focus on this topic raises longstanding issues concerning the adaptation of systems with multiple levels of actors and feedback (Kauffman, 1993) . We invite others to consider the potentially complex effects of failure at this and other levels of analysis.
Finally, we note a key area related to theoretical clarification of the effects of failure. We include both failures and near-failures in our analyses in this paper. Our work suggests that near-failures cause reactions by other firms (and thus, population-level consequences) but brings up the issue of how much failure is needed to produce these effects. How poorly does a firm or set of firms have to do to produce reactions by others? And do the reactions differ by whether a failure or near-failure is involved? Is one more salient than the other? Do firms "learn" better from failure or near-failure? A related issue is that of failure of firms versus the failure of routines. Do reactions differ by type or in consequence of whether it was a firm that failed, a routine that failed without the firm failing (e.g., Sony Betamax), or a group of firms (or entire industry) threatened by failure? More work is needed to clarify these issues.
CONCLUSION
Two major theories that speak to population-level change assume that the failure of organizations may be good for the collectivities to which they belong. Traditional economic theory sees failure as a way of eradicating inefficient businesses, which yields a better mix of routines in the population after the failures. Similarly, population ecology has argued that populations of organizations may move to closer alignment with environmental constraints through failures of firms (Hannan & Freeman, 1977) . Competition produces failure, which leaves more appropriate routines at work in the population. In these frameworks, the impact of the failure of organizations on industry evolution comes primarily from the direct subtraction from industry behavior of the inappropriate and inefficient activities conducted in the particular organization.
In this paper, we have suggested additional effects of failure of individual organizations in industry evolution. It appears to be useful to think of organizational failure as a potential engine for change in the broader population. Failures, although harmful on one level of analysis (individual organization), may be beneficial on another (population). This distinction between the prosperity of individual organizations and the systems they belong to has been noted before. Levinthal and March (1993: 103) , for example, claimed that in nested learning systems it is "relatively unusual for a strategy that maximizes the prospects for survival of the components of a system to be the same as a strategy that maximizes the prospects for the survival of the system as a whole."
Our review indicates that population-level learning from failure can have many forms. We differentiated among (1) direct effects of failure, (2) intentional reactions to failures of others, and (3) unintended outcomes of reactions to failures of others. We further differentiated these types by whether they occur as interorganizational population-level learning or as collective population-level learning. Interorganizational population-level learning can be described as organizations within a population reacting to the failure of one or more other organizations. This type of learning can be interpreted as population-level learning because it arises from shared rather than independent organizational experience. Collective population-level learning, then, involves processes that are collective in nature, such as the creation of new entities that affect the entire population (e.g., industry associations) or the development of new coordination routines (e.g., collective standard setting).
In this paper, we also highlighted the difference between learning from success and learning from failure and the additional benefits of learning from failure. Success of an organization in a population encourages other members in the population to copy the routines of the successful organization, increasing homogeneity in the population. If a population consists of homogenous organizations, the survival of the population can be seriously threatened by hostile environmental changes because all the organizations in the population would be adversely affected by the changes.
In contrast, failure of an organization promotes a search for alternative routines, increasing heterogeneity in the population. At the population-level, the increased heterogeneity in a population can enhance the survival prospect of the population because not all the members in the population would be adversely affected by hostile environmental changes.
Although there have been a number of studies on the effects of failure, the work has been fragmented and often normative. By identifying some of the potentially beneficial effects of organizational failure for the population the organization belongs to, this paper is intended to draw more attention to the study of failure not only as an undesirable outcome of organizational action but also as an engine for learning. The evidence presented suggests that the effects of failure are a potentially fruitful area for the development of more formal propositions and further study. 
